We analyse a change in the degree of transparency of MTS, the electronic inter-dealer market for Italian Government bonds, namely the July 1997 move to the anonymity of quotes. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that a decrease in transparency makes liquidity traders worse-off, whereas large/informed traders find it less costly to execute block trades. The evidence is also consistent with the "waiting game" hypothesis of Foster and Viswanathan (1996) : under anonymity, traders tend to delay their trades in an attempt to acquire information through the order flow.
Introduction
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The electronic inter-dealer market for Italian Government bonds, known as MTS (from Mercato Telematico dei Titoli di Stato), is characterised in international comparison by a high degree of transparency (Inoue 1999 ). In July 1997, 10 years after its inception, MTS switched to a new operation regime in which the names of market-makers who post bid and ask quotes for each security are not revealed.
The switch seems worth investigating because it prompts a number of interesting questions for financial economists and regulatory authorities. What was the reason for the switch? Who benefited from it? How did it affect market performance, in terms of liquidity, efficiency and price volatility? Is market microstructure theory consistent with the evidence? Has the switch altered the way Italian T-bonds are traded on MTS as compared to the over-the-counter market? Can we derive any regulatory policy lessons from the experience of MTS? What are the implications for the development of an integrated sovereign bond market in the European single-currency area?
Market microstructure theory shows that the existence of information asymmetries among participants is a key element in understanding how a financial market is organised and works. If the market is populated by two types of agents with different information endowments and objective functions, the better-informed and the liquidity-motivated, then a given market set-up may be optional for one group but, generally, not for the other. Similarly, a change in the set-up may benefit one group at the expense of the other. The dynamic relationship between the two groups has implications for the consolidation or fragmentation of trading in different markets and for asset price volatility. It can be argued that in a bond market, like ours, the absence of "inside" information on an asset's fundamental value reduces the scope for heterogeneity of beliefs with respect to a stock market. However, we observe that the concept of private information must also include knowledge that dealers may acquire on the order flow and on the trading intentions of large customers, an argument which applies to the bond and foreign exchange markets as well as to the stock market. This knowledge causes an update of beliefs and may be profitably exploited at the expense of other market participants, according to a notion that is also at the basis of the literature on block trading and dual-trading. From an empirical viewpoint, some studies support this hypothesis in the forex market and in the bond market (see Lyons 1995 and Scalia 1998a) , although there is also evidence to the contrary (Proudman 1995) .
The models of information asymmetry point to one conclusion: liquidity traders in general prefer more transparency, informed traders prefer less transparency. This notion was pioneered by the Grossman (1998) model of sunshine trading. Sunshine trading, ie disclosing pre-trade information on the direction of price-contingent orders, removes the possibility that those orders are information-based and thus eases the inference problem of market-makers. This should lower execution costs for sunshine traders and possibly increase overall trading volume. Forster and George (1992) explore the effects of various degrees of traders' anonymity on the distribution of wealth within the two groups of market participants. They conclude that if monitoring who is trading in a centralised system gives information on liquidity trades, then disclosing the identity of current participants lowers execution costs for liquidity traders, provided that there is sufficient competition among privately informed agents. This clearly reduces the expected profit of informed traders. The analysis of Pagano and Röell (1996) provides similar results: in a comparison of alternative trading systems, it is shown that greater transparency, such as that provided by a centralised order execution system with full disclosure, reduces the average trading cost for liquidity traders. Madhavan (1995) examines the issue of post-trade information disclosure and market fragmentation vs consolidation in a two-period dynamic model. The model provides an unambiguous prediction on the implication of different disclosure rules for informed traders and "large" (or strategic) liquidity traders: they should prefer non-transparency because it facilitates dynamic trading strategies, like "working" a large order over time. Without mandatory disclosure, dealers also prefer not to disclose trades voluntarily because they profit from the reduction in price competition. Naik, Neuberger and Viswanathan (1994) investigate the relationship between delayed trade disclosure rules and execution costs in a dynamic market setting with risk averse dealers. If there are two stages of trading, first a public investor who trades with market-maker A, and then A who trades with other competing market-makers, a delayed disclosure rule of the first-round trade by A grants him the possibility in the second round to exploit the information conveyed by the trade itself. In turn, A passes on part of the associated profit to the public investor. The authors stress the fact that their conclusion has a more general bearing: any time less-than-full disclosure of large and informative orders occurs, the dealers who intermediate the order and their customers should be better-off.
Our summary of models that explore the effects of information asymmetry and market transparency is far from exhaustive. However, theory provides an unambiguous prediction in our context: under assumption that significant informational asymmetries exist, the switch that took place on MTS in July 1997 should have shifted the balance between liquidity traders' and informed/large traders' profits in favour of the latter. For the purpose of the tests to be conducted in the following sections, we set forth two hypotheses:
• Hypothesis I: liquidity traders have been made worse-off by the move to anonymity (we shall call this hypothesis the "liquidity trader's curse").
• Hypothesis II: (the "large trader's blessing"): large/informed traders have been made better off.
Our brief survey also suggests a third implication, related to the previous ones. By not disclosing the names of market-makers, the 1997 switch has made the structure of MTS more similar to that of the over-the-counter inter-dealer broker market, where dealers negotiate trades without revealing their identity. We should consider the possibility that dealers in the opaque over-the-counter market (trading either through a broker or vis-à-vis) benefit from the price discovery function of the highly transparent MTS, thus free-riding on the information disseminated by the latter (see also Madriagal 1996) . Hence, before the 1997 shift there would have been two types of free-riding. The first would have been among MTS members, and it is captured by Hypothesis I. The second would have been by the OTC market at the expense of MTS. If the switch to anonymity has reduced the second type of free-riding, making MTS more similar to the OTC market, then the incentives for the informed/large dealers to trade overthe-counter rather than on the regulated market have declined. We have the following hypothesis:
• Hypothesis III ("decline of OTC free-riding"): trading volume on the OTC market has fallen since the MTS shift.
The events that preceded the market move seem broadly consistent with Hypothesis I-III. At the end of 1996 the proposal of anonymity was put forward by a group of MTS specialists (which we may assimilate to the informed/large traders of theory), led by one with foreign affiliation. The main argument advanced by the proponents was that the shift would increase the welfare of the most skilled market players, thus enhancing competition and market efficiency. In fact, the proponents' complaint about the regime of full transparency was that it allowed small dealers to mirror the moves of the big players. Understandably, some small traders had reservations. The treasury and the Banca d'Italia raised no objections. In the end the management board (in which small dealers are lowly represented) approved the proposal, which became effective on 14 July 1997.
The MTS switch of 1997 is also interesting for another reason. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) have explored the possibility that informed traders' signals are different, giving an incentive to informed traders to forecast the price forecasts of others. This may induce each informed trader to delay his transactions and wait for the other traders' moves to reveal more information. The Foster-Viswanathan model has the following prediction for intraday trading activity on MTS.
• Hypothesis IV (the "waiting game"): after the switch to anonymity, the increasing dispersion in traders' opinions reduced market turnover in the early stages of trading and increased it in the later stages.
The previous discussion explains the first objective of this paper. By analysing various market indicators before and after the MTS switch to anonymity, we wish to conduct a test of the four above mentioned hypotheses: the liquidity trader's curse, the larger trader's blessing, the decline of freeriding and the waiting game hypothesis. Another contribution of our test is that we use an original and extensive data set as compared to that of the existing literature.
Should the hypothesised worsening of terms for liquidity traders be the unique, or even the main concern for market regulators? This question raises the more general problem of which market design maximises public welfare, which brings us to the subject of normative economics and regulatory policy. O'Hara (1995) tries to qualify the three goals of a market set forth by Domowitz (1990) . They are (i) reliable price discovery, (ii) broad-based price dissemination, and (iii) effective hedging against price risk.
Concerning the first goal, O'Hara argues that the ability to find a market-clearing price is enhanced by scale and possibly by the existence of multiple settings which suit the needs of different types of traders.
The achievement of broad-based price dissemination is a more contentious issue because the freeriding problem discussed earlier sets up a trade-off between market transparency and the price discovery process in the same market. Broadly speaking, market transparency certainly improves public welfare. However, in a dynamic setting, if the same asset is traded in market A and market B, and market A becomes more transparent, then it is possible that large/informed traders will move from A to B. In this case, it is conceivable that the price discovery process in market A will diminish, to the advantage of market B. 3 Therefore, it is not clear where on the ideal market transparency scale the costs from a reduction in informed trading will outweigh the benefits from greater information dissemination (see eg Franks and Schaefer 1995) . This issue is at the heart of our investigation.
The third goal, namely hedging of price risk, reflects the concern for the market's ability to provide insurance to liquidity traders. The empirical counterpart of this goal is the minimisation of execution costs for liquidity trades and the improvement in general of market liquidity, defined as the property whereby the price impact of an order is small. O'Hara introduces a fourth goal of optimal market design: "(…) another, perhaps greater, function of the market that is not recognised in the working definitions given above (…) is the role of market efficiency. How well and how quickly a market aggregates and impounds information into the price must surely be a fundamental goal of market design."
3
The above statement has no precise implications on the change in the degree of price discovery that derives from a change in the transparency of A for the whole market, given by the sum of A and B.
However, she also notes that the search for market efficiency presents two main problems. First, raising the speed of information aggregation may in principle increase price volatility, which is not desirable. Second, since market efficiency is positively related to the extent of information-based trading, which in turn generates losses for liquidity traders, the goal of efficiency may conflict with that of minimising execution costs for the uniformed. To summarise, although the issue of the optimal design of a financial market remains in O'Hara's words an open question, it seems safe to claim that, provided "sufficient" scale and transparency, the contribution of a market to public welfare should be measured along three dimensions: liquidity, volatility, efficiency (where the second variable clearly exerts a negative effect).
We observe that in the case of the government bond market the pursuit of public welfare along these lines is consistent with the objective of minimising the cost of public debt servicing and with the operating objectives of the monetary and regulatory authorities (Santini 1997) : to carry out liquidity management operations that do not affect the smooth functioning of the market, to obtain information about market expectations, to improve monetary policy implementation in general, to conduct micro-prudential policy. 4 The second objective of our empirical investigation is therefore of a regulatory nature. Because normative economics in this area does not show unambiguously what is the welfare-maximising degree of market transparency, we wish to develop a case study based on the previously noted event.
We observe a change of regime in the arrangement of our market. By estimating the three performance variables defined earlier, both before and after the shift, we try to empirically assess whether it afforded a higher or lower level of welfare. We shall also try to keep into account an important macroeconomic factor that may have influenced the performance of MTS during our sample period, namely the fiscal consolidation process which brought about a sharp improvement in Italy's prospects for early participation in the European Monetary Union. To this extent, we shall provide estimates of the relative weight of the microeconomic effect on our market performance measures, as distinct from the microeconomic effect related to the shift to anonymity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the market. Section 3 presents evidence and tests on Hypotheses I-IV. Sections 4-6 provide estimates and tests on market liquidity, volatility and efficiency, respectively. Section 7 discusses the empirical evidence against the background of theory, the regulatory implications and the prospects for the development of an integrated securities market in the single currency area. Section 8 summarises and concludes. An Appendix table provides a brief history of the Italian government bond market during the last decade.
The market
The securities listed on MTS include all recent Italian Treasury issues: the three-, six-and 12-month bills known as BOTs, the 18-and 24-month bills known as CTZs, the floating-rate notes with initial life of seven years known as CCTs, and the fixed-coupon BTPs with initial life of three, five, 10 and 30 years. The minimum order size is five billion lire, which is by far the modal trade size. Market members are of three types: specialists, primary dealers and ordinary members. 5 Specialists and primary dealers are committed to quoting firm two-way quotes on a wide range of securities, to being competitive in terms of tightness of spreads, and to maintaining a share on the primary and secondary market above a certain threshold, with stricter requirements applying to specialists. 6 Both categories may apply for bond and cash lending with the Banca d'Italia. Ordinary members can trade at the quoted prices. Specialists and primary dealers can also trade at somebody else's quotes. 7 In practice over 60% of transactions take place between two market-makers (specialists and primary dealers). In 4 A detailed survey of market structure and regulation in government securities markets is provided by Dattels (1995) .
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Strictly speaking, specialists are included in the class of primary dealers. Upon demand and subject to the selection criteria set by the Treasury and the Banca d'Italia, a primary dealer may be upgraded to the status of specialist. Downgraded specialists maintain the status of primary dealers.
6
The requisites for specialists are market share above 3% on the primary market and above 1.5% on MTS. Primary dealers must maintain a minimum share of 0.5% on MTS. what follows we shall refer to the players who initiate a trade as "traders", without distinguishing whether they are market-makers or ordinary members.
Trading hours are from 09:00 to 17:10. The market trading mechanism is fully integrated. Each member's video-terminal serves three functions: (1) publication of pre-and post-trade information, including the five best bid and ask quotes for each security, 8 (2) trade execution at a key-press, and (3) automatic clearing and settlement onto the centralised systems for bank reserves and government bonds managed by the central bank.
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In the spring of 1997 the run-up to the annual review of the specialists' requisites, including a check of their market share, contributed to the growth in overall trading volume observed on MTS. Some specialists may have inflated their transactions on an intraday basis, without affecting their open positions at the end of the day, in an attempt to improve their turnover score. After the June 1997 review, the Treasury and the Banca d'Italia decided to lengthen the observation period to two years and to hold the next review in January 2000. 10 Partly as a consequence of this process, daily trading volume changed from an average 36 trillion lire in the second half of 1996 to 45 trillion in the first half of 1997; since then, it has stabilised at around 33 trillion lire.
The data-set employed in the empirical analysis of the following sections includes all MTS transactions, and the identity of the traders, in the period from 1 September 1996 to 31 May 1998. The old regime data sample runs from 1 September 1996 to 13 July 1997 (period 1). The new regime sample goes from 14 July 1997 to 31 May 1998 (period 2). The two samples are approximately equal in length, about 10½ months each. To be precise, there are 213 working days in period 1 and 221 working days in period 2.
3.
Evidence on theoretical predictions
Hypothesis I -The liquidity trader's curse
The first type of evidence we should like to gather is that concerning the change, if any, in the degree of market participation by the informed/large dealers and the liquidity/small traders. To this extent, Table 1 provides summary statistics on the average number of active traders on a daily basis, ranked according to their market share, before and after the switch to anonymity. If we consider the smallest traders (below 0.1% of trading volume) we note that they decrease in number from 15 in period 1 to three in period 2. The second smallest class of traders (between 0.1% and 0.25%) decreases from 110 to 84. The third class (between 0.25% and 0.5%) increases slightly from 59 to 65 traders. The fourth class (0.5 to 1%) increases from 34 to 41 traders. Overall, if we set a threshold for "small" traders at 1%, we note that their average number decreases from 218 to 193. The two classes of the largest traders, from 1 to 2.5% and above 2.5%, both increase, with their sum going from 42 to 48 traders. The reduction in the number of small traders is also evidenced by the data on market concentration, provided in the lower part of the table. The Herfindahl concentration index of traders increases from 3.2 to 3.8%. The degree of concentration measured on the market-makers' side increases from 5.0 to 5.8% on average. The null hypothesis of equal means before and after anonymity is rejected. These results are consistent with Hypothesis I. 
Hypothesis II -The large trader's blessing
The greater concentration among market-makers seems consistent with the hypothesis that large traders have been made better-off. The category of informed and/or large traders can also be detected ex post based on the occurrence of large trades. On MTS a "block trade" as such hardly ever occurs. Due to the prudence of market-makers who post firm quotes, also in terms of size, 99% of transactions occur at or below five times the minimum size of five billion lire. Traders wishing to exchange a large amount of bonds respond to this behaviour by working the order over time. This would suggest to proxy large trades by tracking down the continuations of trades made by the same trader on the same bond on each working day. Things are complicated, however, by the fact that during our sample period a "race for volume" took place (see previous section), and many trades were inflated, ie offset by trades of opposite sign within the same day. To control for this phenomenon, we proxy large trades as follows. Within each working day, we compute the net daily change in each trader's holdings of each listed bond. When the net change in absolute terms is larger than a given threshold, we count one "large trade" for each continuation of trades above the same threshold. Our working variable is then defined as the ratio of large trades so defined to total daily volume.
The evidence is presented in Figure 1 , Panel A, for a threshold of 50 billion lire, and Panel B, for a threshold of 100 billion lire. Each panel reports the daily series of the large trade ratio and an interpolating function. In the case of a threshold of 50 billion lire, the ratio generally lies between 10% and 20%. Panel A shows that the series increases from period 1 to 2, and the tests of equal mean and of equal distribution across periods are rejected. The series obtained with a threshold of 100 billion lire generally lies between 0% and 10%. The evidence across periods in analogous: the ratio increases from period 1 to period 2, indicating that, under anonymity, it has become easier to build/unwind large positions on MTS, and the tests of equal mean and distribution are rejected. These findings support Hypothesis II.
Hypothesis III -The decline of OTC free-riding
In order to gather evidence on the hypothesised shift from OTC to MTS transactions, we used the information contained in the monthly statistical reports of MTS market-makers to the Banca d'Italia. These reports include the OTC trading volume in government bonds of each dealer, with a breakdown for trades carried out with residents and non-residents. We corrected the residents' figures for the effect of double counting by scaling them down by the share of MTS turnover involving trades between two market-makers. We thus obtained an estimate of the OTC volume that is comparable with the MTS exact figures that we possess. We then calculated the ratio of OTC volume over total inter-dealer volume (OTC plus MTS). The resulting figures are given in Table 2 . It shows that the OTC share tends to increase from the end of 1996 onward. The highest OTC share figures are observed in July 1997 (37.3%) and in May 1998 (39.6%). The subdued OTC share in the spring of 1997 may partly be explained by the race for volume that took place on MTS and that no longer occurred under anonymity. The evidence of Table 2 is at odds with Hypothesis III.
Hypothesis IV -The waiting game
If the waiting game hypothesis holds, dealers should try to delay their trades on an intraday basis in the attempt to acquire more information through trade flow, and we would expect a shift of trading volume for the early stages of trading to the later stages. In order to analyse intraday turnover on MTS, we chose the benchmark 10-year BTP issue, which is generally the most heavily traded security. The evidence is given in Figure 2 , which shows the intraday relative volume on the benchmark BTP, ie the share of trading volume observed in each half-hour interval of the day over the total daily volume of the bond. The key findings that emerge from Figure 2 are as follows. First, trading volume increases from the first half-hour of trading (09:00-09:30) to the second half-hour. Second, like in most financial markets, there is a decline in trading activity after 12:30 for about 1½ hours. Third, trading activity remains steady after 14:30 (we recall that the closing interval after 17:00 lasts only 10 minutes, ie one third duration of the other intervals). Finally, we note that from period 1 to period 2 volumes decline slightly in the morning intervals and increase correspondingly in the intervals after 14:30. In fact, 3.2% of total daily volume shifts from trading before 14:30 in period 1 to after 14:30 in period 2. The hypothesis of identical distribution of volumes is rejected in nine out of 17 intraday intervals by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The hypothesis of identical means is rejected in six out of 17 intervals by the t-test. The last finding seems consistent with Hypothesis IV.
Liquidity
Various definitions have been provided in the literature for the concept of market liquidity. Perhaps the most popular one is "a market is liquid if the impact of a trade on price is small". However, the liquidity concept has several other dimensions (see eg O'Hara 1995; Muranga and Shimizu 1997) . The richness of our data-set allows us to conduct an empirical study of market liquidity along different definitions. The first and simplest indicator of market liquidity is turnover. For the reason explained in Section two, namely that trading volume should have been biased by the dealers' effort to maintain their status before the June 1997 review, we do not think that it is useful to compare total MTS trading volume before and after the market move to anonymity. Instead, we prefer to focus our attention on the number of bonds that were actively traded on each day. The second indicator of liquidity is the bidask spread. The (half-) spread is the reward paid by traders to market-makers for their services, which provides immediacy to those wishing to buy or sell a security. The third indicator of liquidity is the market impact of a trade, which is related to the adverse selection problem faced by market-makers and which varies directly with the perceived arrival of orders from informed traders. We present the evidence on each of the above mentioned indicators respectively in the three following subsections.
Active bonds
We choose two statistics to describe turnover on the active bonds. We first rank the bonds traded on each day by their volume of transactions. We then consider those bonds below the median and take (1) their number (ie one half of the total number of traded bonds) and (2) their share over total daily trading volume. These statistics are plotted on a daily basis in Figure 3 . It shows that the number of the 50% least-traded bonds tends to increase in period 1, and thereafter it declines slightly. On average, this number changes from 63.6 in period 1 to 65.1 in period 2. On the other hand, the volume share of the least traded bond shows an increasing trend, and it doubles on average from 6.9% before anonymity to 14.3% after anonymity. The tests of the hypotheses that the mean and distribution of market share by class do not change are rejected.
We note that in addition to the review of the specialists' status (see Section 2), there were also reviews of the primary dealers' status at the end of 1996 and 1997. One of the requisites was related to each dealer's ability to make a market in the illiquid bonds. We attribute the observed increase in the share of the least traded bonds at year-end to the dealers' attempt to qualify in the annual review. This phenomenon seems to have been particularly significant at the end of 1997.
Bid-ask spread
Our intraday data-set does not include data on the bid-ask spread. In order to obtain estimates of the fixed-cost of trading associated with the existence of the spread, we use our intraday transactions data to fit the two-equation empirical model of trade and quote revision proposed by Foster and Viswanathan (1993) (see Hasbrouck 1991 for a thorough discussion). This model is as follows:
Where q t is the signed trade size (eg -5 indicates a public scale of five billion lire at the current bid price) and dp t is the price change that occurred between the previous trade and the current trade. 1 d t =i is an indicator variable equal to one if trade t occurs in the i-th half-hour interval of the day and 0 otherwise. 1 q t =0 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if trade t is a public buy and 0 otherwise. Equation (1) tries to model the expected value of the incoming order conditional on the past record of orders and prices; the residual t is the unexpected component, or the innovation brought about by the order and potentially related to informed trading. 12 The residual in turn becomes one of the explanatory variables of the price change caused by the order, given by the equation (2). In it, the coefficient c is an estimate of the "fixed" component of transaction costs. Assuming that the "true" (and unobservable) value of the bond does not change, c measures the difference between the transaction price and the true price, corresponding to one half of the spread, ie to the compensation for the market marking 12 Equation (1) is run using the logit method.
services provided by the dealer who posted the quote. In practice, since the true bond price does change over time, if we take 2c we do not obtain the actual spread but an unbiased (and noisy) estimate of it. 13 In equation (2) we allow for the possibility that 2c changes during the day, by introducing dummy variables for the half hour intervals i = 2,…,N, where N is the last interval of the GD\ IURP WR WKH PDUNHW FORVH DW ,Q WKH VDPH HTXDWLRQ WKH FRHIILFLHQW PHDVXUHV WKH adverse selection component of trading cost, or market impact of a trade, which enters the total cost of trading when the trade itself is not expected by the market-makers on the basis of the past order flow. $JDLQ ZH DOORZ IRU WKH SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW FKDQJHV GXULQJ WKH GD\ E\ LQWURGXFLQJ N-1) interval dummies. This estimation approach, which recognises the dynamic nature of trading costs, is similar to those employed in a number of previous studies.
14 The evidence on the intraday spread estimates for the benchmark 10-year BTP is plotted in Figure 4 . The first fact that we note is that 2c is roughly W-shaped during the day. The spread has three peaks: at the open, before 14:30 and at the close. The peak between 14:00 and 14:30 (08:00-08:30 US Eastern Standard Time) is related to the market's uncertainty concerning the opening prices of the United States financial markets. The peak may also be related on some days to the upcoming release of United States' macroeconomic indicators. This finding is analogous to previous evidence for MTS (Scalia 1998a) and to the behaviour of the United States' T-bond market (Fleming and Remolona 1997) . The second fact that we note is that the spread in period 2 is uniformly lower than in period 1. In particular, the spread in the initial and final intervals of the day declines from 2 to 1.4 basis points of price.
It may be argued that the estimated reduction of the spread, which is positively related to the asset's expected volatility may have been caused by the general improvement in the Italian Treasury bond market, brought about by the increase in Italy's prospects for early participation in the EMU. This poses the problem of distinguishing the effects that MTS anonymity and the macroeconomic change have had on our market performance variables. As a control variable for macroeconomic improvement, we chose the 10-year BTP-Bund-yield differential.
15 Figure 5 , Panel A shows the series of the estimated bid-ask spread and the BTP-Bund yield differential on a daily basis. This yield differential fell from around 3% in September 1996 to 1% in July 1997 and fell again to 0.25% in May 1998. The bid-ask spread series shows a declining trend in period 2. In that period the differential and the spread are clearly associated.
16
What are the relative weights of the micro-and macroeconomic effects on the spread? In order to provide an answer, we run a regression of the spread estimate over a constant, the differential a dummy equal to one in the second period, and the product of the previous two variables. The weights are obtained as the product of the estimated coefficients by the average value of each variable, as a percentage of total. These weights are reported in Figure 5 , Panel B. The weight of the microeconomic effect, related to the dummy variable, is equal to 56%. The macroeconomic variable, ie the differential, accounts for 10%, and the third variable (the differential times the dummy) accounts for 34%. Adopting a cautious stance, and attributing the last estimate entirely to the macroeconomic effect, we observe that the microeconomic effect accounts for over one half of the total improvement in the bid-ask spread from period 1 to period 2. 13 In order to control for residual heteroskedasticity caused the different length of time between subsequent trades, we weight each observation in equation (2) by the inverse square root of the time elapsed since the previous trade. We thus run equation (2) with the weighted least squares method.
14 Equation (2) is instantaneous, ie there are no lagged effects of prices or quantities. According to Hasbrouck (1991) , the inclusion of lagged terms in the price equation would be justified under the following circumstances: (a) inventory effects are in place, such that dealers seek to smooth the holdings of bonds over time; (b) there is "price-discreteness", due to a large tick-size; (c) prices adjust slowly to new information. In our setting, we think that the case for hypotheses (a)-(c) is weak, and the inclusion of lagged terms would only affect the efficiency of the estimates. Therefore, we see no compelling reason for departing form the Foster-Viswanathan instantaneous-modelling approach. The average adjusted R-square of our daily equations is equal to 0.36. 15 Another plausible proxy might be the market perceived probability of Italy's early participation in the EMU. This estimated probability measure and the BTP-Bund spread are strongly correlated. 16 This is confirmed by a simple regression of the spread over a constant and the differential (not reported for simplicity). We also perform a Chow stability test that the regression coefficients are identical between period 1 and period 2. The results show that the differential is directly related to the spread; however, this effect is limited to period 2, and the stability test is rejected.
Market impact
The +DV EHHQ LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH JHQHUDO PDFURHFRQRPLF LPSURYHPHQW RI WKH PDUNHW" )LJXUH , Panel A shows the market impact series and the yield differential series. The evidence, again, is that the differential is positively related to the spread in period 2, but unrelated to it in the earlier period.
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The results on the weights of the micro-and macroeconomic effects are given in Panel B, obtained with the same methodology of the previous subsection. The microeconomic effect turns out to be extremely large, equal to around 69% of the total price impact. The macroeconomic effect accounts for the remaining 31%.
Volatility
We estimate volatility on an intraday basis as the squared log-difference of the bench mark 10-year BTP prices, taken at half-hourly intervals. The resulting evidence is presented in Figure 8 . Intraday volatility displays a U-Shape. Although its estimate declines in the last interval of the day, we recall that the different length of the interval itself does not make the corresponding value comparable to estimates for earlier intervals. 18 Volatility is largest in the initial interval of period 1, when it is equal to 0.03%. Throughout the rest of the day it is much lower, generally below 0.015%, and it rises after 14:30. The second fact that we note is that volatility in period 2 is uniformly lower than in period 1. In particular, volatility in the first half hour of trading declines from 0.030 to 0.011. Moreover, after 14:30 the increase in volatility is less pronounced. Figure 9 , Panel A provides evidence on the relationship between the BTP-Bund yield differential and volatility on a daily basis. The picture is slightly different from the case of the spread and market impact. A direct relationship between yield differential and volatility is found; this is significant in period 2 only; however, the Chow stability test between periods can not be rejected. The evidence of panel B is that the microeconomic effect has a weight of 37% on volatility, ie much smaller than in the case of the cost measures, whereas the macroeconomic effect accounts for the remaining 63%.
Efficiency
The notion of financial market efficiency implies that prices fully reflect all available information. As is well known, Fama (1970) distinguishes three types of efficiency: weak form efficiency, which requires that no investor can earn excess returns based on historical price information; semi-strongform efficiency, which implies that no investor can earn excess returns by applying trading rules based on any publicly available information; and strong-form efficiency, which implies that no investor can earn excess returns using any type of information, whether public or private. While strong-form efficiency is unachievable if one accepts the view that information asymmetries are a relevant factor in explaining dealers' behaviour, weak-form and semi-strong-form efficiency are in principle attainable by a financial market. In particular, the hypothesis of weak-form efficiency has been tested by empirical studies on leads and lags between cash and futures markets for the same security, in which prices are strictly correlated due to a no-arbitrage argument. The evidence in the case of bond markets is available for Japan and Italy. In Japan the JGS inter-dealer cash market is driven by the futures market, with cash prices lagging behind the price of the 10-year JGS contract traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange by two minutes on average (Miyanoya, Inoue and Higo 1997) . In the case of the Italian BTPs there is evidence of reciprocal causality between the futures contract traded on LIFFE and the benchmark 10-year BTP traded on MTS in the years 1992-1993; furthermore, 17 The Chow stability test between period 1 and 2 is rejected. 18 Under the hypothesis that bond prices follow a Brownian motion, our (squared) volatility proxy in the last interval should be multiplied by 30'/10'=3 in order to express it in half-hourly terms.
the futures lead can not be exploited to earn excess returns on MTS, consistent with weak-form efficiency of MTS with respect to LIFFE (Scalia 1998b ; see also Angeloni et al 1996) .
Has MTS changed its record of efficiency with respect to LIFFE following its switch to anonymity? This question is relevant because traders in the two marketplaces are not fully integrated, particularly concerning their access to information on monetary policy implementation, the Treasury's issuing decisions and the order-flow. The empirical analysis that follows seeks to update previous evidence, while improving the type of data and the power of the causality test.
Our data sample includes all MTS transactions on the benchmark 10-year BTP and all BTP futures transactions at LIFFE in the period from September 1996 to May 1998. 19 We also employ an intraday data-set, obtained from the Reuters service, that contains market prices and quotes at five-minute intervals on the following financial instruments: the three-month eurolira futures contract at LIFFE (last trade price), the Deutsche Mark/US Dollar exchange rate (last bid), and the 10-year Bund futures contract traded at LIFFE (last trade price). The general motive for the inclusion of these variables in a VAR analysis of causality is to take into account the behaviour of the world financial markets that potentially may explain the behaviour of BTP prices, ie we should like to include in a parsimonious way all the relevant information set. We observe that, compared with previous studies, we take a step from the notion of weak-form efficiency to that of semi-strong-form efficiency, which involves the predictability of prices based on all publicly available information. The specific reasons for this set of variables are as follows. The short-term rate futures captures the attitude of domestic monetary policy. The DM/USD exchange rate is the reference exchange rate for Europe, reflecting the relative degree of monetary tightness between the United States and Germany. The Bund futures prices incorporate the attitude of investors towards the European fixed-income market.
After taking the log-differences of our intraday time series at five-minute intervals (simple differences for the eurolira rate), for each day in our sample we ran a VAR system of equations in order to check if any pattern of causality emerges among the prices of our financial instruments, and in particular between BTP cash and futures prices. 20 The evidence on absolute contemporaneous correlation among variables is given in Table 3 , Panel A. The evidence on the VAR estimates is contained in Panel B, which gives summary statistics (frequency and mean) on the coefficients that turned out to be significantly different from zero across all days. The maximum lag length with significant statistical power in both samples is 10 minutes (two lags). However, since the second lag of variables turns out to be significant in a negligible number of cases, for ease of presentation the table reports only the evidence for the first lag of variables.
The key facts that emerge from our estimates are as follows. First, as with previous evidence from many financial markets worldwide, all our series display substantial mean-reversion at five-minute intervals. In particular, the average mean-reversion coefficient for the BTP cash price is -0.41 in period 1 and -0.35 in period 2; the averages for the BTP futures are -0.33 and -0.41, the averages for the eurolira rate are -0.33 and -0.31. Second, contemporaneous correlation of price changes between cash and futures BTP is extremely high (0.72 and 0.64 on average in periods 1 and 2, 21 as one would expect based on the no-arbitrage principle. Third, causality between cash and futures BTP runs in both directions. In particular, the five-minute average lead of LIFFE declines from 0.39 to 0.34, while the average lead of MTS is almost unchanged, from 0.33 to 0.32. Furthermore, while the number of days in which LIFFE displays a significant lead on MTS declines from 30 in period 1 to 18 in period 2, the corresponding frequency for the MTS leads increases from 17 days in period 1 to 25 days in period 2. Finally, there is evidence of positive two-way causality between price changes of the Bund futures, on one side, and of the BTP cash and futures, on the other side. Interestingly, we observe that contemporaneous correlation increases over time (from 0.47 to 0.51 for the benchmark BTP, from 0.49 to 0.55 for the BTP futures) and that causality from the Bund to the BTP becomes positive in a number of cases in period 2. These phenomena are consistent with the hypothesis that, thanks to the improvement in the prospects of first-round participation of the lira in the EMU, in period 2 the Italian and German bond markets have become more integrated.
Compared with the evidence on causality for the years 1992-1993, when the LIFFE lead over MTS was of 15 to 30 minutes with an intensity of 0.25-0.30, in recent years the lead has become much shorter, and the frequency of cases in which it is longer than five minutes is just four days out of 309. The MTS lead has increased compared to 1992-1993.
Discussion and regulatory policy implications
We summarise the main empirical findings of the previous sections.
A. Small traders' participation on MTS decreases from period 1 to period 2.
B.
Large traders' participation increases.
C. Large trades on MTS become more frequent in period 2.
D.
The share of OTC transactions over total inter-dealer trading increases slightly from period 1 to period 2.
E. The shape of intraday trading volume on the benchmark bond is slightly displaced towards the late trading intervals of the day, from period 1 to period 2.
F. The share of trading volume of the 50% least traded bonds on MTS doubles from period 1 to period 2.
G.
The intraday bid-ask spread is W-shaped, and the spread in period 2 is uniformly lower than in period 1.
H. The mDUNHW LPSDFW LV XQLIRUPO\ ORZHU LQ SHULRG 2 than in period 1.
I.
Volatility is U-shaped and uniformly lower in period 2.
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J.
The increase in Italy's prospects for early participation in the EMU is correlated to the improvement in spread, market impact and volatility in period 2, but virtually uncorrelated to them in period 1. The macroeconomic effect explains between 31% and 63% of the improvement in market performance.
K.
Causality between BTP cash prices on MTS and futures prices at LIFFE runs in both directions.
L.
From period 1 to period 2 the intensity of causality from either market becomes similar, the frequency of the LIFFE lead declines, the frequency of the MTS lead increases.
The first theoretical hypothesis that we made was that the smaller MTS traders, who are most likely to be liquidity motivated and uninformed, have been made worse-off by the market move to anonymity. Finding A is clearly consistent with the "liquidity trader's curse". Some small traders, although formally MTS members, may have withdrawn from active market participation because under anonymity they have less control on the "real game" played by the large traders, thus being unable to mirror their moves. It seems likely that either or both of the following phenomena may have occurred in period 2:
(1) small players deal more frequently on an OTC basis through large dealers, and are prepared to pay a commission for the superior information possessed by the latter; (2) small players participate more actively in the uniform-price auctions of Treasury securities. The counterpart to this are findings B and C, suggesting that the "large trader's blessing" has indeed occurred. Under anonymity large traders are better able to carry out big inventory adjustments, which in period 1 were presumable executed on the OTC market.
The estimated increase in the share of OTC trading volume (finding D), although a small amount, is somewhat puzzling. It is the opposite of Hypothesis III. The "decline of OTC free-riding" hypothesis is actually related to two considerations. First, anonymity makes MTS more similar to the OTC interdealer-broker market. This increases ceteris paribus the incentives to trade on MTS. Second, under 22 Concerning the findings G, H and I, for control purposes, we also ran the empirical tests on market liquidity and volatility using a different set of securities, namely the just-off-the-run five-year BTPs. In a ranking of daily trading volume these bonds generally lie between the fifth and the 15th most traded issues. The evidence (available from the authors) confirms the findings for the 10-year benchmark bonds. However, finding E is no longer observed on five-year BTPs.
anonymity it becomes more difficult for the OTC market to free-ride on price and order-flow information provided by MTS. This phenomenon may cause an increase in trading cost on the OTC market, and may induce some dealers to trade directly on MTS. Are there any other reasons for the observed increase in OTC turnover? It is possible that the OTC inter-dealer brokers have reacted to the 1997 MTS shift, which increased competition between the two markets, by reducing spreads. We note an interesting example concerning competition between the OTC market and MTS. Cantor Fitzgerald, one of the major brokers trading Italian bonds from London, had often used MTS through an intermediary in the past; at the end of 1997, it applied for membership with MTS and in May 1998 it started trading large volumes directly on the Italian market. Since MTS prices reflect a more homogeneous market set-up, it is now conceivable that they can be straightforwardly applied to OTC transactions. If this is so, then OTC free-riding on MTS might have even increased after the MTS switch.
The fourth theoretical prediction that we investigated is the waiting game hypothesis of Foster and Viswanathan. Finding E is consistent with this hypothesis: under anonymity the order flow information of MTS has become less useful to dealers, and they tend to wait longer in order to extract more information. There is a further reason for the slight displacement of the intraday profile of trading volume in period 2. During our sample period the Italian market has become increasingly integrated with the other major financial markets. Among these, the US market is an important source of information and it has been a growing source of investment into the Italian market. Hence, the information and orders that start arriving on MTS from 14:30 onward, ie from the opening of the US market and the release time of most US macroeconomic indicators, have increased over time, and this clearly contributes to the observed shift in intraday trading volume on MTS.
Findings F to L represent in our opinion impressive evidence on the improvement in the performance of MTS in recent years. In interpreting these results, we face an attribution problem. As we argued earlier on, two distinct factors may have played a role, namely the switch to anonymity, a one-time event that took place in the middle of 1997, and the steady progress of public finance of 1996-1997. We tried to distinguish between these two factors, and obtained results that show that the microeconomic effect amounts for 31 to 63% of the variation in the market performance variables. In the case of the two cost measures, the microeconomic effect is more important. In the case of volatility, the macroeconomic effect takes first place. This is not surprising, since market volatility may be expected to be more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions than trading costs.
An additional factor that may have played a role is the listing to repo contracts on MTS starting in December 1997. Repo contracts on Treasury bonds have been traded among dealers on the OTC market for long before that date. However, cash traders greatly benefited from the inception of repo trading directly on MTS, through a reduction in the cost of setting up short positions. This may help explain why the speed of price discovery on MTS has increased with respect to the futures market (findings K and L).
From a regulatory point of view, the evidence presented in this paper has several implications. The first implication is domestic. The move to anonymity has furthered the reform process of the Treasury bond market that the Italian regulatory authorities initiated in 1994 (see the Appendix table) . This reform was aimed at restoring the competitive role of MTS with respect to the OTC market, by opening up the former to foreign investors, lowering transaction costs and promoting competition among dealers. Since 1994 MTS has greatly increased efficiency and turnover relative to the OTC market. As we have shown, the 1997 shift helped to enhance this competition, affording higher levels of welfare for those who invest in Italian Treasury bonds. The improvement of the secondary market should also have benefited the issuer, through a reduction in the cost of debt servicing. We conclude that the 1997 innovation on MTS has proved successful.
The second regulatory implication follows from the first one. Looking at the Italian Treasury bond market from a more general perspective, we note that the market has made a remarkable progress in just one decade, from an opaque, lowly liquid market with negligible foreign participation to a highly transparent and liquid market with a large participation of international investors. This progress has been similar in nature to developments in other industrialised countries, but in the Italian case it has been more intense. To this extent, MTS has played a key role. The ideas that have underlain the MTS inception and development have proved successful in the medium term. These ideas are: (1) full automation of the trading mechanism; (2) transparency; (3) large participation; (4) inside and outside competition. We believe that the experience of MTS may be useful for those emerging countries wishing to establish a liquid and efficient financial market in a relatively short time horizon.
In 1998 the market was fully privatised. A major development took place in September 1998, namely the listing of a eurolira 10-year bond issued by the European Investment Bank and of a large group of German government bonds. 23 The listing of sovereign bonds from other countries is also planned. In the perspective of EMU, it has been argued that the likely integration of the European bond markets might imply either a strong cooperation among sovereign issuers, or a "race to benchmark status" (McCauley and White 1997). In both cases, the role of each country's government bonds within the European market will be positively affected by the liquidity conditions of the domestic market and by the availability of the securities in the portfolios of international investors, even more than by the creditworthiness of the issuer. In this view, the improvement in the liquidity of MTS, along with the decision by the Italian Treasury to convert all outstanding debt in euros on 1 January 1999, places the Italian issues in a strong position among the partner countries' issues.
Conclusion
We analysed a change in the organisation of the electronic inter-dealer market for Italian Treasury bonds known as MTS, namely the shift to the anonymity of quotes in July 1997. The implications of this event were investigated in the light of market microstructure theory and from a public welfare perspective. We employed an extensive data-set which includes all transactions carried out on MTS with the identity of the traders, in the period from September 1996 to May 1998. In addition, we used intraday prices for the BTP futures contract traded at LIFFE and for a set of financial instruments that may be viewed as explanatory variables for the dynamics of BTP prices. Our evidence supports the hypothesis that the decrease in transparency makes liquidity traders worse-off, whereas large/informed traders find it less costly to execute block trades. The evidence is also consistent with the "waiting game" hypothesis of Foster and Viswanathan (1996) on intraday trading: under anonymity, traders tend to delay their trades in an attempt to acquire information through the order flow. From a public welfare perspective, our results indicate that the move to anonymity has been accompanied by an increase in market liquidity and by a reduction in volatility, a phenomenon that is also partly explained by the growth in Italy's prospects for early participation in the EMU. The speed of information aggregation on MTS increases, as shown by an improvement of the MTS lead over the futures market. From a regulatory policy perspective our evidence suggests that, despite the welfare loss suffered by small traders, the move to anonymity has afforded an overall improvement in market performance. In this respect, the experience of MTS may be useful for the development of market mechanisms in emerging countries. Finally, in a European perspective, the current organisation and performance of MTS place the market in a competitive position compared to other cash markets for government bonds, and may contribute to a closer integration of these markets under the EMU. The paper "Does market transparency matter? A case study" discusses the influence of a decrease in transparency resulting from anonymous trading on the Italian MTS electronic trading system, a dealer system. The study supports the theoretical evidence that a decrease in transparency makes liquidity traders (those traders who know only the price process) worse off whereas large informed traders (those who know more about fundamental asset values than others) are better off because they can better exploit their private information.
The study indicates that the decrease in transparency was associated with an increase in market liquidity, a reduction in trading costs and in price volatility and with an increase in market efficiency, defined as the degree to which prices fully reflect all available information.
Market transparency is usually defined as "the ability of market participants to observe the information on the trading process". However, transparency has many dimensions because a market has many kinds of participants and many types of information. The information can either be public (available to all market participants eg publicly announced statistics) or private (not available to all market participants and including both inside information about fundamentals and information on order flows or customer behaviour).
The study discusses the impact of a change in transparency of the Italian MTS resulting from a move to anonymity where the names of the market makers who post bid and ask quotes were no more revealed. In the study the change of transparency only treated one type of information in a specific market microstructure namely a quote-driven dealer market.
Academic findings are far from conclusive regarding the relationship between the level of transparency and the liquidity of bond markets. But in a dealer market, such as MTS, which is yet highly transparent, decreasing certain kinds of transparency can sometimes be beneficial. However, this may not lead to general conclusions about the relationship between transparency and liquidity which the study does not but I would like to stress the importance of this for the audience.
Transparency of market information has two aspects namely pre-trade quotes and post-trade information on prices/quantities actually transacted.
An early disclosure of information on specific orders, including the names of the dealers posting the orders linked to the size of these orders, does indeed appear counterproductive for the liquidity of dealer markets because of the risk of disclosing the movements in the market-maker's books. A too immediate (eg real-time) dissemination of this information to the market may reduce the incentive for dealers to make markets. Other elements of the pre-trade price transparency, such as the publication of aggregated volumes by limits, are beneficial to the liquidity of the market.
Where the study finds that the reduction of pre-trade transparency (move to anonymity) has had positive effects on the liquidity of the market, it does not give any indication of the effects of a disclosure of more detailed information after trade execution (post-trade transparency). Post-trade transparency makes markets fairer but it becomes harder for market makers to unwind positions quietly as prices would be more responsive to trades. Therefore it also may reduce liquidity. In a dealer market, the right balance has to be found between the level of transparency and the interests of the involved market-makers.
After these general observations on the interaction between transparency and liquidity, the reading of the paper leads us to three, more specific remarks and comments.
Firstly, the data used in the empirical analysis are the transactions in the period from September 1996 to end May 1998. It is mentioned in the study that macroeconomic effects have had a very important impact on the market performance. It has to be stressed that during the second part of the period under review, financial markets in Europe and thus also government bond markets were largely influenced by the impending introduction of the euro and the gradual emergence of pan-European financial markets. This was certainly the case in Italy.
Secondly, in accordance with the theoretical models, the decrease in transparency caused a reduction in the number of small traders. Even if the number of the larger traders increased, the overall number of market participants declined. In a context of bond markets where a limited number of global market-makers captures a growing size of the order flow from institutional and retail investors, the increasing market concentration should be a matter of concern because of its negative impact on the liquidity of the market. This applies even more to smaller markets where the number of market participants often is limited.
Finally, the empirical evidence shows that the reduction in transparency was accompanied by a decline in volatility but that the microeconomic effect (introduction of pre-trade anonymity) explained only 37 per cent of this evolution. Should the anonymity move have been taken today, then it seems doubtful that there would be a significant impact on volatility. At present, the most important dealers in the eurozone automatically derive their posted prices from a set of (exogenous) parameters like the corresponding yield of the Bund-future.
Let me now give a few remarks on the Belgian experience with electronic trading platforms for government bonds.
MTS Belgium has been operational since 5 May 2000. It introduced the Italian model and started directly with anonymous trading. At present, the dealer quotes and the order book are only available to market participants. Discussions are under way with information vendors to allow them to disseminate market information on their screens (with a certain delay) which will improve the market transparency.
All fixed rate OLO bonds with a remaining life to maturity of over 1.25 years are currently traded on MTS Belgium (16 bonds), representing a total outstanding amount of 138 billion euro.
For the time being, 16 primary dealers in Belgian government bonds and 1 market maker have access to the system. Market access will further be extended to domestic and foreign financial intermediaries in the capacity of price taker.
Five Belgian bonds are currently traded on EuroMTS representing a total outstanding amount of 48 billion euro. The first introduction took place on 9 September 1999.
Since 3 July 2000, twenty Belgian bonds are traded on Broker-Tec.
The market share of electronic trading can be estimated at roughly one third of the total turnover of purchase/sale transactions in OLO bonds. Turnover in OLO bonds on Broker Tec has been marginal since its launch.
The electronic trading of Belgian government bonds, especially their introduction on EuroMTS followed by the launch of a domestic MTS, has resulted in lower transaction costs in terms of fees and bid/ask-spreads compared to the OTC market. This is also due to the straight through processing facilities MTS provides. As such, it has improved the liquidity of the secondary market. Further improvements in market transparency and an increasing number of market participants should give an additional boost to market liquidity in the future.
Conclusions
If conceptually a totally transparent market should be favourable for the liquidity of bond markets, practically in a dealer market, a compromise has to be found between the level of transparency and the involvement of the market-makers who expect a return on the capital invested in the market making activity. In Italy, where a reduction in market transparency (move to anonymity) has led to an improvement of market liquidity, the MTS market seemed initially "too transparent". By contrast, the introduction of electronic trading in Belgium increased market transparency which, together with lower transaction costs, improved market liquidity.
Comments on "Does market transparency matter? A case study" by Antonio Scalia and Valeri Vacca Peter Rappoport, JP Morgan
The asymmetric information view of markets points out that traders' behaviour will be driven in specific ways by the environment in which they trade. It predicts, for example, that bid-offer spreads should be wider, the greater is the chance that a market maker has to trade with informed individuals, and that liquidity may be lowered by transparent trading, because transparency limits the return to marketmaking. Any theory that can successfully predict liquidity conditions would very quickly find a place as a market staple.
To test such a theory, a controlled experiment would be the best, and one actually appears to have been provided by the move of the MTS system to anonymous trading in mid-1997. The authors argue cogently that this change in rules would have four principal observable implications. Some are related to the shift in the "balance of power" towards large market specialists, to the detriment of MTS "liquidity traders", and those in the OTC market who faced a reduced flow of information. Others follow from the change in the optimal trading strategy under the new rules.
The authors provide a clear and erudite exposition of an impressive battery of tests of these hypotheses. With one exception, they find that things moved in the predicted direction following the switch to anonymous trading. As liquidity improved following the introduction of anonymous trading, they suggest that anonymity may be a desirable feature to incorporate into the design of new markets.
My interest in this paper is in where it leaves one on the broader questions related to liquidity I outlined at the start. Should the paper's evidence give one a new respect for the asymmetric information dimension of market microstructure, or is there something else going on? Essentially, the question is not so much one of whether the predicted directions of the responses to lower transparency are confirmed. It is more a matter of whether the effects of the change are large, relative to the other influences on the way markets trade. Here, things are less clear.
For example, the only hypothesis contradicted by the authors' evidence is that the OTC market should have suffered, because its ability to "free-ride" on information about sources of MTS flows was curtailed. However, the authors cogently argue that there were other extenuating circumstances at the time that could have led to the continued growth in the OTC share of the market. But then, how big are these extenuating circumstances in other instances?
I have little doubt that asymmetric information considerations are present where prices are set by market makers. But at least in the bond world, it seems hard to believe they are dominant. The only information advantage that seems to be around in government bonds concerns not so much an inside track on fundamentals, such as interest rate policy or macroeconomic news, but knowledge of flows, ie that a big liquidity trade is imminent, from which profits can be made by "positioning ahead". Here, there is no winner's curse in having traded with the informed: the fundamental value of the securities bought (sold) has not necessarily fallen (risen). The only thing that has been missed is the opportunity to make life difficult for the trader who knows of the liquidity flows, and, thereby, to increase the chance of gaining some of the returns from the flows for oneself. Asymmetry of information may be more important in equity markets, where information on individual stocks' fundamentals can plausibly flow slowly enough among market participants for market makers to worry about the winner's curse. However, in corporate bond markets, which presumably dance to the same fundamentals tune as equity markets, inventory management appears, to me at least, to be a more pressing concern, and a more proximate determinant of bid-offer spreads.
The evidence presented by the paper does have something to offer on the importance of asymmetric information, but it is not very encouraging. As predicted by the theory, a move to lower transparency should lower the bid-offer spread. Figure 4 in the paper, reproduced below shows the bid-offer spread during half-hour periods in the trading day.
Indeed, the curve shifted down once trading was made anonymous. However, the magnitude of the shift is small in comparison with the fluctuation in bid offer throughout the day, both before and after June 1997. This cycle is also evident in BTP prices and price volatility. Bid-offer seems to be widest at the times when, perhaps, traders are least closely focussed on their screens. Is wide bid-offer a simple way of trading on autopilot? Why doesn't someone in this highly competitive market quote a narrower bid-offer at these times? Or are they times when there is a higher density of informed traders?
Probably not: Figure 2 shows that the volume of trading is lowest at the times when bid-offer is widest.
One can engage in the obvious drole speculations about what drives the daily cycle. However, the simple fact is that when you trade on MTS has more effect on the liquidity you will experience than the rules under which you trade. So it seems like the first order of business is to understand why these fluctuations can take place. And at first blush, here as in other instances mentioned above, asymmetric information does not appear to be the most promising answer.
